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COMIMINTS
ASPECTS OF DIVESTITURE AS AN ANTITRUST REMEDY
America's antitrust policy has traditionally been corrective rather than pre-
ventive.1 Although its recent thrust is more pointedly directed at "incipient
restraints" and the "reasonable probability" of anticompetitive effects'2 the
full impact of our antitrust machinery is usually not appreciated until a monop-
olistic situation has developed or is reasonably certain to develop. In such
instances, divestiture of corporate stock or assets, the epitome of corrective
antitrust enforcement, may be ordered.
Divestiture today creates problems considerably different from those faced
in the early landmark cases. Wide public ownership of the modern corporation
and ubiquitous tax regulation have created problems unknown to the early
trustbusters.
Symptomatic, or perhaps at the forefront of a current trend toward a broader
effectuation of antitrust policy is United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,3
where the Supreme Court ruled that the proposed merger of two Philadelphia
banks was subject to the operation of the antitrust laws-in particular, Section 7
of the Clayton Act. The Court pointed out that Congress did not intend to
exclude bank mergers from the act, and, further, that prior agency approval
under the Bank Merger Act of 19604 did not immunize a bank merger from
the antitrust laws.3
The singular breadth of authority which has been given the courts in the
antitrust field had fostered a somewhat more reactionary attitude toward the
philosophy of "those aiming at immediate realization of the social, political
and economic advantages of dispersal of power."" This attitude is, in part,
the rationale of a still viable judicial reluctance to order a divestiture, especially
where "violations . . .can be eliminated by means of the other provisions of
the judgment [and] .. .divestiture . . . is not necessary to foster competi-
tion .... ,,7 Thus, although "power to dissolve an unlawful combination clearly
exists, and should be exercised when necessary to give complete relief, the
1. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 176 (1955).
2. See the review and interpretation of the legislative history of the 1955 amendment of
§ 7 of the Clayton Act in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962).
3. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). This case was the most important antitrust decision of the year
and, perhaps, of the decade, according to Antitrust Division Chief William H. Orrick, Jr.
Mr. Orrick has noted that the case put to rest any lingering notions that the banking industry
as a whole was exempi from the antitrust laws, and added that the case applies to all mergers,
not merely to bank mergers. Address by Ass't Att'y Gen. W. H. Orrick, Jr., ABA Antitrust
Section Meeting, Aug. 12, 1963, Trade Reg. Rep. 1 50197, at 55220-21.
4. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
5. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-55 (1963).
6. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
7. United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 871 (D.N.J. 1953).
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legislative policy is clearly to resort to restraint rather than to dissolution,
except where restraint alone is inadequate.""
In view of a recently increasing reliance on divestiture as a remedy, it is
surprising to note the statement, in 1955, by the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, that "over the 60-odd years of Sherman
Act history, courts have in only 24 litigated cases entered decrees requiring
divorcement, divestiture or dissolution."9 It may be that in the past the judi-
ciary. has too often vigorously denounced monopoly power in their opinions and
then ordered what amounted to a relatively mild form of relief. 10 On the
other hand, it is clear that prior to the amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act," much of this "judicial reluctance" was a direct result of inadequate
legislation, 12 and, simply the human tendency to resist the drastic changes
generally involved in divestiture.' 3 Finally, judicial misconceptions of economic
factors have been cited to explain an overreliance on the self-regulating forces
of competition.'
4
Divestiture is not new. The early cases involved the giant holding companies
in the railroad, oil and tobacco industries.' 5 Quite typical of the monopolistic
holding company cases is Northern Securities Co. v. United States,10 where the
defendant held large interests in two railroads. This combination was held to
destroy competition between them. Rather than face a potentially disastrous
forced sale of the stock, the defendant company was permitted to distribute it
in kind back to its original owners, thus reinstating the situation as it existed
prior to the illegal combination.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States 7 and United States v. American Tobacco
Co.'8 are the two most important of the earlier cases, enunciating some of the
basic remedial policy underlying a divestiture decree. They have both been
8. United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 217 Fed. 656, 658 (N.D. Ohio 1914).
9: Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 354 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
10. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). "It
is a case in which the Government . . . won a resounding legal victory only to suffer a
crushing economic defeat .... On the problem of relief the court merely recommended that
remedial measures be withheld until such time as the district court could evaluate the effects
of the Government's program for the disposal of surplus aluminum plants." Adams, Disso-
lution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 Ind. L.J. 1, 6-7
(1951).
11. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
12. See Handier & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Act,
61 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 652 (1961).
13. See Van Cise, Limitations Upon Divestiture, 19 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 147 (1950).
14. See, e.g., Adelman, Economic Aspects of the Bethlehem Opinion, 45 Va. L. Rev. 684,
685-86 (1959).
15. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
16. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
17. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
18. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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criticized, however, as poor examples of what a dissolution policy can accom-
plish.' 9 The Standard Oil decree left economic control over the newly divided
companies in the same hands that had exercised control over the parent
company prior to the dissolution.20 In American Tobacco, the defendant was
divided so as to create firms of too small a size to be individually subject to
monopoly prosecution under the Sherman Act.21 Unfortunately, their successor
firms were large enough to join in a monopolistic conspiracy which, years later,
was held violative of the antitrust law.22-
After suffering a number of resounding defeats and being rebuffed by the
famous ruling that the law does not make mere size an offensem the govern-
ment won a major victory in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.2 4
But in spite of this victory and several lesser achievements, Congress viewed
with alarm the post-World War II merger movement superimposed on the
mergers of the 1920's which had themselves firmly implanted an oligopolistic
structure in most basic industries.2 5 Congress finally moved to remedy the
situation in 1950 by amending Section 7 of the Clayton Act,20 thereby more
broadly proscribing27 increased concentration through vertical, horizontal or
conglomerate mergers. 28
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 2  and Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States3" are two of the most significant recent cases ordering divestiture.
19. Adams, supra note 10, at 2.
20. Stocking, Workable Competition and Antitrust Policy 324-25 (1961).
21. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371, 374-76 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
See also Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of Monopolistic Size, 40
Colum. L. Rev. 615, 618-19 (1940).
22. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
23. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
24. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
25. Houghton, Revelations and Paradoxes of Recent Antitrust Decisions, 7 Antitrust
Bull. 733, 736 (1962).
26. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
27. "Congress contemplated that the 1950 amendment would give § 7 a reach which
would bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations, from pure stock acquisitions to
pure assests acquisitions, within the scope of § 7. Thus, the stock-acquisition and asets-
acquisition provisions, read together, reach mergers, which fit neither category perfectly, but
lie somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342 (1963). (Emphasis omitted.)
28. With reference to corporate mergers, the term "vertical" refers to the integration of
two firms at different levels of production or distribution of the same product, e.g., an auto-
mobile manufacturer's acquisition of a steel mill. A horizontal merger is the acquisition of one
firm by another at the same level of production, e.g., the merger of two retail organizations.
"Conglomerate merger" is a catch-all referring to the merger of two companies with no
clasifiable relationship to one another; this is frequently applicable where the aim of the
merger is diversification. See Clark, Conglomerate Mergers & Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
36 Notre Dame Law. 255, 256 (1961).
29. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
30. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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In Du Pont the Supreme Court ordered complete divestiture of Du Pont's stock
holdings in General Motors.3 ' Under the plan, sixty-three million shares of
General Motors stock is to be distributed to holders of Du Pont common by
February 28, 1965.32
In Brown Shoe the Supreme Court ruled that the merger of Brown, the
nation's fourth largest shoe manufacturer, and Kinney, which owns the nation's
largest independent chain of family shoe stores,83 followed the dangerous trend
toward concentration in the shoe industry and had purposeful anticompetitive
motives, and thus violated the present section 7. Fortunately for both, when
the merger had been negotiated in 1956, it was conditioned upon the mainte-
nance of complete separation between the two companies as to their assets
and operations. Such a situation appreciably reduced some of the more painful
aspects of divestiture.
I. PROCEDURE
A. Statutory Authority
The Government may pursue a divestiture order against a corporate de-
fendant for violations arising under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 4 and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.35
The original Section 7 of the Clayton Act" was dealt "the apparent death
blow" by the Supreme Court in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC.87
This section, which authorized a divestiture order against illegally held stock,
was held not to apply to assets acquired by direct purchase or otherwise.
One of the major purposes of the amendment passed in 1950 was to close this
loophole.3 8 The section now provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or . . . the assets of another corporation .. ., where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.3"
The prohibition of this section is considered to include "mergers with a probable
anticompetitive effect,"40 thus proscribing, inter alia, incipient concentration.
41
31. 366 U.S. at 334-35.
32. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 1 70245 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
33. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 331 (1962).
34. 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
35. As amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
36. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
37. 291 U.S. 587 (1934) ; see Martin, Mergers and the Clayton Act 118 (1959).
38. See S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
39. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
40. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
41. Id. at 317-23. The scope of the amended section is also treated extensively in United
States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 3'4 U.S. 321, 335-49 (1963).
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B. Enforcement
To enforce federal antitrust laws in general, and to prosecute divestiture
cases in particular, we have what is sometimes called "dual enforcement," or
"overlapping jurisdiction" of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice.4 2 Although the functions of these two
agencies were originally quite different, the enforcement potential of each is
actually quite similar, despite current dissimilarities as to investigative powers
and authority to seek pre-merger injunctions4 3 The two organizations work
together to avoid duplication of effort, and strive to assign a case according to
its particular demands and the possible familiarity of one agency with a
particular company or industry.44 Although, in FTC v. Cement Institute,45
the Supreme Court refused to find anything wrong with both agencies proceeding
against the same violation, the Government, as a practical matter, has not
thereafter done so.
Actually the only specific statutory reference to divestiture as a remedy for
a section 7 violation is in Section 11 of the Clayton Act, wherein the Federal
Trade Commission is granted authority to order a violating corporation to
"divest itself of the stock, or other share capital or assets" illegally held."
This section in no way impinges on the power of the Department of Justice to
request divestiture under section 7. In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that
"complete divestiture is peculiarly appropriate in cases of stock acquisitions
which violate § 7,"47 and further; that "it should always be in the forefront of
42. In addition to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission, there are about twenty other federal agencies with varying degrees of
scope and responsibility for the enforcement of antitrust laws. Massel, Competition and
Monopoly: Legal and Economic Issues 320 (1962).
43. Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis 251-60 (1959).
Statistics indicate the extent to which section 7 cases have been apportioned. "As of August
25, 1960, 106 complaints had been filed against alleged illegal mergers since 1914. Of these,
53 were issued by the Federal Trade Commission and 53 filed by the Attorney General. Since
the 1950 amendment of Section 7, the Attorney General has filed 33 complaints alleging
violations and the Commission has issued 40." Kintner, Developments Under the Antimerger
Act and Other Aspects of the Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust Program, 5 Antitrust
Bull. 387, 388 (1960).
44. "On some matters, criminal sanctions imposed by the courts may be most appropriate;
on other matters, the Commission's broad powers to investigate, subpoena, and require reports
may be most effective. Sometimes one agency has a more complete recent experience with a
particular industry. These are only a few of the many considerations which may influence
the decision on which agency shall proceed in a given situation." Gwynne, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Laws, in Understanding the Antitrust Laws 149 (Van Cise ed.
1958).
45. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
46. 38 StaL 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
47. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328 (1961). (Emphasis
added.) But see, Hander, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 Record
of N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 433 (1962) ("But as things stand now . . . the Government has been
squarely rebuffed in its efforts to convert Section 7 into a per se statute.").
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a court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found. '48
Although the Commission itself may bring proceedings leading to divestiture,
it may also be designated as a "master in chancery" to determine the appro-
priate relief in a suit instituted by the Attorney General. Section 7 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act provides in part that "the court may, upon the
conclusion of the testimony ...if it shall be then of opinion that complainant
is entitled to relief, refer said suit to the commission ... to ascertain and report
an appropriate form of decree therein. '40 The section thus provides the court
with a talented overseer to apply the relief, while at the same time freeing the
court to attend to other cases." ° Unfortunately, this section is rarely if ever used,
apparently because most courts, after becoming familiar with a case and finding
a violation, choose to administer the remedy, believing that a referral to the
Commission would unduly delay the matter."'
After the FTC uses its extensive investigative powers, 2 a commission pro-
ceeding begins with the initial decision of a hearing examiner. His findings
are then reviewed by the five-member Commission itself. A divestiture order
issued by the Commission operates much like a court injunction, and, if violated,
may be enforced in a court of appeals with penalties being assessed at the
court's discretion. Appeals may, of course, be taken from the Commission's
findings, by either the alleged violator or by the Commission as the case
may be.53
The Justice Department's Antitrust Division once lacked the investiga-
tive powers of the Federal Trade Commission, often finding itself stifled
by a company's refusal to cooperate in an investigation. 4 However, as to the
relative effectiveness of the Division's enforcement, this disadvantage was per-
haps balanced by its ability to bypass administrative hearings and immediately
avail itself of the courts to enforce appropriate remedies.55
48. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 47, at 331.
49. 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 47 (1958).
50. Commenting on referrals to the FTC under this section, a former aide suggests that
the present Commission may be ill equipped to handle any sizable case, but what Is needed
is "to proceed with somewhat more deliberate speed to build an atmosphere and the personnel
at the Trade Commission so that the conception of Congress may be fulfilled." E. Rocke-
feller, Antitrust Enforcement: Duopoly or Monopoly?, 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 437, 447.
51. Kaysen & Turner, op. cit. supra note 43, at 255-56.
52. See, e.g., St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961), where the Su-
preme Court held that the Commission could compel production of copies of Census Bureau
reports, despite the fact the reports stated on their face that they "cannot be used for purposes
of taxation, investigation or regulation." Id. at 216 n.6.
53. 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21(b), (c), (d) (Supp. IV, 1963); 38 Stat. 719
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958).
54. Hearing on S. 167 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-66 (1961) ; see Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 343-49 (1955).
55. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (Supp.
IV, 1963), giving the Justice Department the power to examine company books and records
[Vol. 32
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Once an alleged violator decides to appeal a divestiture order, a series of
administrative and enforcement problems are created, usually resulting in con-
siderable cost and delay. Litigating the appeal actually involves two quite
distinct steps. The enforcement agency, whether it be the Justice Department
or the Federal Trade Commission, must first establish the fact of the violation
requiring divestiture.56 Only then can the agency proceed to the second
step of obtaining the approval of the court for an effective, yet equitable plan
for disposing of the illegally held stock or assets.5T Such a complex task has
been aptly termed the "big" antitrust case.
Upon certification by the Attorney General that a case is of general public
importance, a three-judge federal district court may be convened to hear an
antitrust case.58 However, out of consideration of the court's time and the
pressure of other litigation, this is rarely done. The result is that one judge is
left to decide a case of far-reaching importance. This procedure for handling
"big" cases has been criticized for its lack of consistency and uniformity in en-
forcement, and for the tremendously heavy burden it places on the individual
jurist.59 Although the violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act may, themselves,
be more subtle though less burdensome to prove, than Sherman Act violations,
it would nonetheless seem advisable to rely, at least occasionally, upon the
procedure of having three judges hear the testimony in a "big" case.
In a sense, the Supreme Court becomes a victim of the standard procedure
under which the "big" case is litigated. Antitrust procedure permits direct
appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court.60 Although the Court usually
during civil antitrust investigations, may eliminate these investigative "disadvantages." For
the first time in its history, the Department has a compulsory device for gathering evidence
before filing its civil antitrust cases. Previously, it had to rely on the cooperation of companies
under investigation or upon grand jury proceedings in cases where criminal proceedings also
were contemplated. Trade Reg. Rep. Letter, No. 55, September 24, 1962. Matter of Gold Bond
Stamp Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade Cas.) ff 70872 (D. Minn., Aug. 9, 1963), has
upheld the constitutionality of the act against the charge that it was violative of the fourth
amendment, and adopted a nonrestrictive interpretation of § 3(b) (1) which states that the
"demand shall ... state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation ... and
the provision of law applicable thereto." Id. at 78520. The test adopted by the court was
whether the demand "is sufficient to inform adequately ... and sufficient to determine the
relevancy of the documents demanded for inspection." Id. at 78521. (Emphasis omitted.)
56. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294, 308 (1962).
58. 56 Stat. 199 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1958). This section of the Expediting Act provides
in part that upon receipt of the Attorney General's certification of the case's public importance,
"it shall be the duty of the chief judge ...to designate immediately three judges ... to
hear and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so designated to assign
the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and deter-
mination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited."
59. Kaysen & Turner, op. cit. supra note 38, at 254.
60. 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958). This section provides: "In every civil
action brought in any district court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein
1963]
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upholds the decree in the absence of a showing of the district court's abuse
of its "large discretion,"'61 the Court nonetheless is required to sift through
the records, which are usually "most voluminous and their review exceedingly
burdensome. '0 2 Mr. Justice Clark, citing the two and one-half year period
between the district court and Supreme Court hearings on the Brown Shoo
case, inferred that the procedure did not live up to its purpose since it "seldom
results in much expedition.10 3
II. CONSIDERATIONS IN DRAFTING A PLAN OF DivEsnTuRE
It is difficult to discuss the elements involved in a divestiture with any
degree of specificity. Every divestiture situation presents its own unique prob-
lems. Industries differ, companies within an industry differ, and the passage of
time brings different products and novel competitive situations.
Today, in our more sophisticated economy, divestiture obviously creates
problems considerably different from those faced in the early landmark cases.
The sixteenth amendment, the authority for taxing personal income, was not
ratified until 1913, and thus, tax consequences did not have to be considered
prior to that date. Another important point is the wide public ownership of
industry today, as contrasted with the high degree of control in the hands of
a relative few in past eras. Today's average shareholder is largely an
investor with no practical control over management. He is truly "innocent"
regarding his corporation's antitrust violations, and thus, his interest must be
given high priority in drafting the plan for divestiture. Finally, in this age of
job specialization and high unemployment rates, special consideration should be
accorded to the contractual and social rights of employees, so as to cause the
least possible economic disruption.
Ideally, account should not be taken of these considerations until divestiture
has been determined to be the necessary remedy. In actual practice, however,
the interests of the corporate defendant, its stockholders and employees are
often weighed with the public's stake in a freely competitive economy to
determine initially the feasibilty of a divestiture order. To counter the govern-
ment's demands for a decree of divestiture, counsel for the defendant corporation
will usually demonstrate to the court the hardships which a divestiture order
would work, and will suggest one or more alternative remedies which it is felt
will accomplish the same end, but without the hardships to private interests.
If the argument for the alternative remedy fails and divestiture is ordered,
the "hardships" argument is again employed, this time to attempt to mold a
divestiture plan most favorable to the private interests involved.
the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court
will lie only to the Supreme Court."
61. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 322 (1961).
62. Id. at 323.
63. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962) (concurring opinion).
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III. ALTERNATrVE REMEDIES
Nothing seems quite so harsh as a divestiture order, and the very suggestion
of it causes the defense to search for alternative proposals. Assuming that a vio-
lation has definitely been found, the initial consideration in designing an
alternative remedy is the character of the illegally held property. If the vio-
lation consists of stockholdings, perhaps the "passing-through" or even disen-
franchisement of voting power will suffice as a remedy; whereas with patent
rights and leasing operations the court may permit the assets to be disposed of
in an orderly fashion over a period of time, rather than demand their imme-
diate and perhaps costly elimination. Finally, although not strictly an alterna-
tive, the severity of an ultimate divestiture may be considerably eased by a
court injunction requiring the assets of merging firms to be kept separate
pending a determination of the legality of a prospective merger.
The pass-through remedy was approved by the district court in the Du Pont-
General Motors case.64 Although that decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court; the Court did so because it believed divestiture was necessary under
the special circumstances involved, and not because it objected to the use
of this form of relief in a proper case. The district court, in approving the pass-
through relief, held that it would be "unnecessarily harsh and punitive" to
require Du Pont to divest its holdings in General Motors and that it would
be sufficient if voting rights in General Motors were divested and passed
through to Du Pont shareholders.6 5 To insure the effectiveness of its decree
the court went further and incorporated injunctive provisions relating to trade
between Du Pont and General Motors.6 6 Although the pass-through relief may
require somewhat more imagination and additional expense as well as time to
the court, defense counsel should evaluate this alternative, and in the appro-
priate case take the initiative in proposing such a plan.
The 1956 consent decree involving Western Electric Company and American
Telephone and Telegraph Company 7 illustrates how patents may provide an
escape from complete divestiture. According to the Government, the chief
purpose of this action was to restore competition in the manufacture and sale
of telephone equipment produced and sold almost exclusively by Western
Electric at noncompetitive prices.68 The Justice Department's main proposal
for achieving this purpose was to separate Western Electric from American
Telephone and to dissolve Western Electric into three competing manufacturing
concerns. Although several of Western Electric's satellite organizations were
finally ordered to be divested, the basic Western Electric-American Telephone
relationship was permitted to remain essentially intact. The most important
relief achieved, at least partly in lieu of complete divestiture, was that part of
64. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. I (N.D. Ill. 1959).
65. Id. at 51.
66. Id. at 52.
67. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. U 68246 (D.N.J. 1956).
68. Goldberg, The Consent Decree: Its Formulation and Use 38-39 (1962).
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the order which required the defendants to grant nonexclusive licenses to
any applicant under all existing and future patents. From the defendants'
standpoint they took a "licking" as to the patents, but this was certainly not
too large a price to pay to avoid divestiture of Western Electric.
Although in the Brown Shoe case divestiture was finally deemed necessary,
its circumstances admitted of a variant solution to the potentially more severe
repercussions that a divestiture might cause. There the Government brought
suit to enjoin consummation of a merger of two corporations, on the ground
that it would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied and the companies were permitted to merge, but only on
the condition that their assets be kept separately identifiable. Subsequent dis-
entanglement of the merger in obedience to the Supreme Court's affirmance of
a section 7 violation was thus considerably facilitated by the lower court's
far-sighted action.
IV. TAX CONSEQUENCES
The tax consequences of a divestiture order may play a predominent role
in drafting a plan, the classic example of this being the Du Pont-General
Motors case. The problem centers on the taxing of a profit realized on the
distribution of stock or disposition of other assets. Generally, there is no
question that the antitrust violator is entitled to capital gains treatment on
profits realized from a divestiture. But even then taxes may be a severe
burden. In the Du Pont-General Motors case there was tremendous price
appreciation on the sixty-three million shares of General Motors stock held for
forty-odd years, and consequently, despite capital gains treatment, the taxes
would normally be very high. In less extreme instances, however, with the
vigorous policing of mergers under section 7, divestiture is more likely to be
ordered within a reasonably short time after the acquisition of the property,
and thus, for tax purposes, there may be no significant difference between the
value at the time of disposition and the value at the time of acquisition.
Where the tax is negligible, the issue is weighted accordingly in drafting
the plan. This is usually the situation where the acquiring corporation, eager
to obtain the sought after property, pays a premium price which is difficult or
impossible to match at a subsequent "forced sale." Although the loss of the
premium asset may injure shareholders in another manner, no injurious tax
consequences are felt by them in such a situation.
While some instances involve the severity of the capital gains tax, others
present the question of whether the profits obtained through the sale of the
illegal assets even qualify for the "luxury" of capital gains treatment. A
recent United States Court of Appeals decision, American Can Co. v. Com-
missioner,6 9 is enlightening on this point. As an alternative to the Govern-
ment's request for complete divestiture of operations under which container-
closing machines were leased but never sold, American Can Company won
69. 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963).
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approval of a plan to sell the machines to its customers. The company then
urged capital gains treatment for profits under the plan on the ground that
the subjective intent of the seller is determinative, i.e., that the equipment
was not "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business ... since it was the compulsion of the antitrust
decree, and not business policy, that resulted in the .. sale . ... ." The court
rejected this argument in holding that, irrespective of motive or cause, "the
fact remains that . . . the taxpayer held the machines for sale as part of its
ordinary trade or business." 71 Considering the effort involved in establishing
capabilities for selling what amounts to a new addition to the product line,
this alternative to complete divestiture could well prove as unpleasant as the
remedy it seeks to avoid.
The Du Pont-General Motors Case
The Du Pont-General Motors case7 2 involved two industrial giants and
thousands of average citizens who held stock in one of the companies, and was
so unique that it is unlikely that a similar case will ever occur. Nonetheless, the
case presented, and perhaps resolved, the serious tax complications of a sizable
stock divestiture.
In 1961, when the Supreme Court ordered complete divestiture of Du Pont's
sixty-three million shares of General Motors stock, the existing law would
have taxed such distributed stock as ordinary income, requiring individual
stockholders to pay income tax at rates ranging from sixteen to eighty-seven
per cent on the full market value of the stock received.73 Mass selling of both
Du Pont and General Motors stock would have resulted from some investors'
seeking to avoid paying the tax and from others being forced to liquidate
part of their holdings in order to pay the income tax on the balance, with a
resultant depression of market prices and a loss to stockholders of both com-
panies running to several billion dollars.74
The solution came in 1962, prior to the district court's final divestiture
decree, when the President signed legislation granting tax relief to share-
holders in the Du Pont-General Motors divestiture.- The bill provides that
noncorporate shareholders may treat the distributed General Motors stock
as a return of capital rather than as ordinary income. The fair market value
of General Motors stock on the dates of distribution is to be used to determine
how much; if any, capital gains tax must be paid. This means that there will
be no tax to the individual stockholder unless and until the value of the
70. Id. at 605.
71. Ibid.
72. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
73. Background Information, United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company,
General Motors Corporation, et al., Public Relations Department, E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Company, Wilmington, Delaware, p. 4 (1962).
74. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 51 (N.D. 31L.
1959).
75. 76 Stat. 4 (1962), 26 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. IV, 1963).
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General Motors shares he receives exceeds the cost of his Du Pont stock.
However, the distribution would serve to reduce the tax base of holdings in
Du Pont.76 Whether this procedure will become the general rule for similar
situations remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that the future will bring any startling changes in
either the basic mechanics of a divestiture, or even in the frequency or
vigor with which the Government seeks to employ the remedy. While it is
true that divestiture has become more prominent in recent years, one has
only to look at its opposing forces to see the obstacles to its widespread use.
Bigness in American business and industry has been "inbred" too long to
attempt any regression. Much of our "bigness" is essential from the stand-
point of the demands for efficiency, for capital investment, for relatively secure
employment, and for the ability of American industry to compete with foreign
monopolies in world trade. All this is not to deny that divestiture will remain
important for the integrity of the nation's antitrust policy, but only to indicate
that divestiture can have farther-reaching consequences than simply those in-
volving the immediate parties.
How then should divestiture be used? Legislation has been introduced to
lessen the difficulties of the Justice Department in obtaining preliminary
injunctive relief in antimerger proceedings. 77 In urging passage of such a bill it
has been noted that even if the Government later shows the merger as an
antitrust violation, the court may find it difficult or impossible to design an
effective divestiture. Although the impact of Brown Shoe may be a step
toward such legislation, 78 easier government access to injunctive relief, or a
plan requiring government approval of all mergers, seems too restrictive and
could possibly result in a business climate in which even mergers conducive
to healthy competition would become suspect. Perhaps the answer lies in a
continuance of the present policy with a concerted effort to provide speedy
advisory opinions by enforcement officials to merging companies who wish, by
the simple expedient of obeying the law, to avoid possible future hardships to
themselves and their investors.79
76. Since the distribution is regarded as a return of capital, the stockholder will be
required to subtract the value of the General Motors stock received from the cost of his
Du Pont stock to arrive at a new tax cost basis for computation of capital gain or loss upon
any subsequent sale of the Du Pont stock. Background Information, supra note 73, at 3.
77. See, e.g., H.R. 12032, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1962 Trade Cas. 1 76684 (E.D.
Mo. 1962).
79. It should be noted that both the Justice Department and the FTC presently give
advisory opinions. But, as to the operations of the Commission, in the words of an agency
spokesman in an appeal for more funds, "the success of this new instrument is being threatened
by the FTC's most ancient enemy-delay," and often the needed guidance is offered too
late to achieve its purpose. Trade Reg. Rep. Letter, No. 97, July 1, 1963. New FTC rules and
procedures describe current Commission policy as to the rendition of advisory opinions.
28 Fed. Reg. 7082-83 (1963), amending 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.91-93 (1963).
